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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 30/ 1982, the Public Service Commission
(PSC) granted an application by Utah Power & Light Company
("UP&L" or the "Company"), allowing it to adjust its Energy
Balancing Account ("EBA") for the period September 1981,
through August, 1982 (the "Relevant Period"), by transferring
$6,012,000 (representing approximately one-third of UP&L's
revenues from non-tariff sales during 1981) from the EBA to its
general account.

The PSC Order was reversed by the Utah

Supreme Court on May 22, 1986.
RELIEF SOUGHT
By this Petition, UP&L seeks a rehearing of these
cases and the decision of the Court: (1) affirming the Order of
the PSC; or (2) remanding these cases to the PSC for additional
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

1

In Re Application of Utah Power & Light Co., No.
82-035-14, slip op. (P.S.C. Utah Dec. 30, 1982), aff'd on
rehearing. No. 82-035-14, slip op. (P.S.C. Utah July 5, 1983),
rev'd, Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service
Commission, Nos. 19361 and 19362, slip op. (Utah May 22,
1986). The PSC Order dated December 30, 1982, and the PSC
Order on Rehearing dated July 5, 1983, are collectively
referred to herein as the "PSC OrderH. The Court's Opinion of
May 22, 1986, is referred to herein as the "Opinion".

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS OF LAW OR FACT OVERLOOKED
OR MISAPPREHENDED BY THE COURT
UP&L claims that the Court's decision overlooks or
misapprehends the following points of law or fact:
I.

II.

III.

(

THE COURT HAS MISAPPREHENDED UP&L'S ARGUMENT THAT
THE PSC ORDER DID NOT CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE
RETROACTIVE RATEMAKING.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILS TO
CONSIDER THE PSC ORDER IN IN RE APPLICATION OF
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, slip op. (P.S.C.
Utah Aug. 2, 1982).
IF THE COURT CANNOT AFFIRM THE PSC ORDER BECAUSE
OF INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW CONCERNING THE EBA, IT SHOULD REMAND THESE
CASES FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO BE MADE BY THE PSC.
ARGUMENT

A petition for rehearing is proper and should be
granted where the court, in its original opinion, misapprehends
or overlooks points of law or fact or where the findings and
conclusions of the court/ board or commission below are
inadequate or unclear (thereby raising, in each instance,
questions as to whether a correct result was or could be
reached) or where it is necessary to correct an injustice in
the original opinion.

See, e.g.. Kirchaestner v. Denver &

R.G.W.R. Co.. 118 Utah 37, 225 P.2d 754 (1950); Rule 35, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure; 5 C.J.S. Appeals & Errors § 1411.
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POINT I
THE COURT HAS MISAPPREHENDED UP&L'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
PSC ORDER DID NOT CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE RETROACTIVE
RATEMAKING.
A.
The Court's Decision Erroneously Characterizes as
Prohibited "Retroactive Ratemakinaw An Accounting Adiustment
Designed, As the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking is
Designed, To Encourage Efficiency,
"Before there can be retroactive ratemaking there must
at least be ratemaking."

Southern California Edison Co. v.

Public Utility Commission, 20 Cal. 3d 813, 576 P.2d 945, 144
Cal. Reptr. 905 (1978).
In its Order on Rehearing dated July 5, 1983, the PSC
stated, inter alia, that "the proposed adjustment is consistent
with Commission intent that the EBA eliminate inequitable
results or windfall benefits to either the Company or its
ratepayers" and that the "proposed adjustment is consistent
with other adjustments previously and currently made in the
[Energy Balancing] Account procedure in that all are
retroactive in nature and none alter the Commission approved
rate."

Order on Rehearing No. 82-035-14 (P.S.C. Utah July 5,

1983).
The Court's decision overlooks the rationale behind
the rule against retroactive ratemaking and erroneously
characterizes as prohibited "retroactive ratemaking" an
accounting adjustment designed and intended to avoid the same
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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thing the rule itself seeks to avoid.

As the court recognized,

the general prohibition against retroactive ratemaking is
intended Mto provide utilities with some incentive to operate
efficiently . . . .M

Opinion at 2.

The PSC Order allowing the

accounting adjustment in this case is consistent with this
underlying policy because it encourages efficiency by
protecting UP&L from being penalized for aggressively marketing
excess energy production to non-tariff users in an unusual
situation of abnormally high reduced demand by tariff
ratepayers where its generating capacity would otherwise remain
idle.
The Court misconstrued UP&L's argument that the
accounting adjustment effected by the PSC Order was not
retroactive ratemaking.

The Court failed to note the

difference between a change in the general rate charged tariff
customers and the type of accounting adjustment allowed by the
PSC Order.

UP&L sought one-time relief from the penalty

imposed by the EBA system because of its unexpectedly high
non-tariff sales and did not seek an increase in the general
rates charged tariff customers.
Without the modification made by the PSC's Order, the
EBA system provides a disincentive to make non-tariff sales.
By applying the entire amount of all non-tariff revenues
(instead of only that portion of those revenues which is equal
to the energy costs of producing those revenues) as a general
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

offset against energy costs, the EBA system produces an
economic penalty to the utility which attempts to keep costly
facilities in use in times of reduced demand by tariff
ratepayers.

By stopping or reducing production from its

facilities during such times, UP&L could reduce operating costs
and net revenue losses.

The EBA system, as applied without the

modification made in the PSC Order, penalizes the utility which
keeps its facilities in operation and aggressively sells the
excess capacity to non-tariff ratepayers.

UP&L submits that it

is anomalous, in the name of protecting against inefficiency,
to strike down a procedure which protects against inefficiency.
The accounting adjustment proposed by UP&L is
analogous to the accounting adjustment ordered by the
California Public Utility Commission in Southern California
Edison Co., 576 P.2d 945, cited in the Opinion.

In each case

there was an unusual one-time surfeit of funds in the energy
balancing account.

In each case, absent some adjustment, one

group, either ratepayer or shareholder, would be unfairly
o
penalized.
In Southern California Edison the Court

2

In Southern California Edison, the adjustment was
necessitated by excess revenues in the fuel adjustment account
caused by a change in tax accounting procedure that resulted in
one-time, significant profits to the company. The Supreme
Court of California allowed a one-time accounting modification
to pass some of the benefit on to ratepayers.

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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determined that such a one-time accounting modification was
merely an equitable adjustment and did not constitute
retroactive ratemaking.
In the Opinion, the Court noted its assumption "that
the EBA order was promulgated under the Commission's ample
general power to fix rates and establish accounting
procedures.-

Opinion at 6, n. 4.

The Court described the EBA

as
a rather unique device for handling not only the
utilities' unstable fuel costs, but also other cost
and revenue items which the PSC felt were subject to
rapid and unpredictable fluctuation.
Opinion at 3.

The Court further noted that

ideally, over the long term, the account is
zeroed out, i.e., the revenues flowing into
the account will equal the expenditures
charged to it. Thus, the EBA accomplishes
the purpose of the pass-through legislation
to allow expeditious rate response to those
elements of cost which are subject to
frequent fluctuation, and it does so without
bypassing the more formal requirements of
general rate making.
Opinion at 4.

If the EBA is recognized as principally an

accounting device of the PSC to implement general pass-through
legislation, it follows that the PSC should be able to
authorize changes in the accounting procedure to allow that
procedure to more accurately reflect proper allocations of

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

energy costs.

The Commission must have the continuing power

and responsibility to administer and improve the EBA system.
At the time the EBA was created, the PSC contemplated that
accounting adjustments would need to be made periodically to
correct inaccuracies in the accounting procedures.

See, In Re

Application of Utah Power & Light Co., Nos. 78-035-21 and
79-035-03, slip op. at 16 (P.S.C. Utah July 20, 1979).

In

furtherance of this continuing power and responsibility, the
PSC has, in the PSC Order and in the Mountain Fuel case, supra,
encouraged and directed these parties, the Division of Public
Utilities and "other interested parties" to consider the
solutions to the inequitable results which occur in the EBA.
PSC Order, No. 82-035-14 )P.S.C. Utah Dec. 30, 1982); Mountain
Fuel case, supra, at 6.
Since the EBA is intended to be "zeroed out" on a
periodic basis, it is essentially an account balancing
mechanism designed to achieve equitable adjustments and the
fair and equitable exercise by the Commission of its general
powers on a continuing basis.

Under the Court's decision this

purpose is frustrated by a rigid and inviolate application of
the rule against "retroactive ratemaking."

UP&L submits that

the Court's decision effectively emasculates the EBA system and
precludes it from being fairly administered.

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B.
Even if the Court Does Deem the Modifications to
the EBA Account to be Retroactive Ratemaking, UP&L Believes
that the Court Should have Allowed An Exception to the General
Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking.
The prohibition against retroactive ratemaking is not
absolute.

{

"The spectre of retroactive ratemaking must not be

viewed as a talismatic inhibition against the application of
principles based upon equity and common sense."

Roberts v.

Narragansett Electric Co., #82-156-M.P., slip, op. at 5 (R.I.,
Jan 11, 1984).

The court in its Opinion recognized the

possibility of exceptions, at least implicitly, when it stated
the rule that utilities "are generally not permitted to adjust
their rates retroactively to compensate for unanticipated costs
or unrealized revenues.H

Opinion at 2 (emphasis added).

The

key factor in determining whether to apply the rule against
retroactive ratemaking should be whether application of the
rule will further the public policy rationales underlying the
rule, or will ultimately frustrate those rationales.
The real fear behind retroactive ratemaking is that
M

if a utility's income were guaranteed, the company would lose

all incentive to operate in an efficient, cost-effective
manner, thereby leading to higher operating costs and eventual
rate increases.177, (R.I. 1980).

Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d
It is that public policy of stimulating

efficiency that should guide the court in determining whether
to apply the rule prohibiting retroactive ratemaking.
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A great many states have recognized that utilities
should be allowed retroactive rate increases to offset the
effects of unusual circumstances such as freak winter storms.
See, e.g.. Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d 177,
(R.I. 1980) (citing cases from Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania.)

The one-time accounting

adjustment sought by UP&L is prompted by an analogous unusual
circumstance.

In each of these cases:

the change in revenue

or expenses was a result of an unforeseen and unforeseeable
circumstance; the utility did its best to mitigate the negative
effects of the situation and to operate as efficiently as
possible; and the purpose of the accounting adjustment was to
spread the risk associated with the incident fairly between the
shareholders and the ratepayers.
Application of the rule against retroactive ratemaking
in this case does not further any of the public policies behind
the general rule. A rigid application of the general rule
against retroactive ratemaking in this case situation will
discourage attempts to market excess generation capacity and
actually defeat the purpose of the rule.

This reality is

illustrated by the following statement of the court in
Narragansett:

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(

The next time a storm of this magnitude
occurs, the company would have no incentive
to hire outside line and tree crews to
restore service efficiently and swiftly to
customers if no reimbursement for
extraordinary expenses would be
forthcoming. Thus, application of the rule
to expenses related to such an emergency
situation so inexorably related to the
public health and safety would serve to
thwart the goal of efficient customer
service.
Narraaansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d at 179. This
Court should recognize an exception to the general rule against
retroactive ratemaking in extraordinary situations such as the
one presented in the present case.
The Court's holding that the rule against retroactive
ratemaking precludes the adjustment to the EBA allowed by the
PSC Order fails to recognize that the effect of the EBA system
and the Court's ruling in this case is to retroactively reduce
the rates to the ratepayers by the entire amount of UP&L's
non-tariff revenues during the Relevant Period (less the amount
thereof allocated to defray energy costs).

Thus, it is not a

question of whether or not "retroactive ratemaking" has or has
not occurred but whether or not UP&L is to be penalized for its
efforts to earn non-tariff revenues from which the ratepayers
can be benefited.

Had UP&L not utilized its facilities to make

non-tariff sales there would have been no resulting benefit
available to the ratepayers.

Fairness requires that UP&L not

be penalized for its effort to avoid this result.
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

*

'

POINT II
THE DEciSION OF THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILS TO
CONSIDER THE PSC ORDER IN IN RE THE APPLICATION OF
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, No. 81-057-19 slip op.
(P F.C. Utah Ana. 2. lQr^>
opini, .. ;...

^vsrt stated:

Neither the facts nor the opii.^n 1Application of Mountain Fuel Supply to
Adjust the Base Rate for Natural Gas
Services in Utah, Case No. 81-057-19, cit«: "
by the PSC as precedent for this action,
in the record, and that case apparently *
not appealed to this Court. Therefore, w = are unable to determine if there were
similar circumstances or if, in fact, an
identical diversion of funds wd& allowed.
Opinion at '» 11 •!
The Mountain Fuel c a s e should have been r:onsid' ,j » <'jri 'hy
t h e Courf

borrius^ mi i ni ,'• ossein, i a i il <.| i i i e n i i c a i lo ihti p r e s e n t

c a s e on i t s tcicts cii'inl! is an important p r e c e d e n t and statement
of -he p o l i c y of t h e PSC in a d m i n i s t e r nu| I hi-1 F!F<A iiysln
Mountain FueJ di-

i. ii • s c a s e , the PSC allowed

In

non-tariff

r e v e n u e s which weie c r e d i t e d t o an energy b a l a n c i n g account
(Mountain Furl Supply Accounl

fh

i t f i "I'lenei «J J ni i "\;II fiiii i a c c o u n t s ,
Fuel had s u f f e r e d
by t a r i f f

I'eiJi l i o n s ,

I .lis

I

br I iiin.sh-.M i

A a in I h e p r e s e n t

significant

jratopaye •

MM)

Il I <»

r,i . , PI u n t a i n

l o s s e s from i e d u c t i o n s in demand
i

t i n i I Ii
niiMJi! e f f o i l s

to generate

Id t ihi»r ,>l
significant

non- tariff sales revenues (i.e., revenues from various
-IIDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

hose

i

(

transportation arrangements, sales for resale, and the sale of
liquid hydrocarbons)•

It also sought to have the EBA

procedures modified to allow a portion of these non-tariff
i

revenues to be transferred to its general revenue account.

In

approving the stipulation between the Division and Mountain
Fuel allowing this adjustment, the PSC noted that in a previous
Mountain Fuel Supply matter (Case No. 80-057-10), it had
specifically authorized Mountain Fuel to:
petition this commission for exceptions to
balancing account treatment for "other
revenues," if in the company's opinion other
treatment is warranted. Such requests will
be considered on a case by case basis and
will take into account financial stability
of the company.
Mountain Fuel, at 5.
Fairness and consistency in administering the EBA
system requires that UP&L be allowed the same kind of
adjustment in its EBA with respect to the unusually high
non-tariff revenues received by it during the unusual
circumstances which existed during the Relevant Period as
Mountain Fuel was allowed under similar circumstances during
essentially the same period.

The Court should consider the

Mountain Fuel case as an additional reason for treating the PSC
Order as something other than "retroactive ratemaking" or as an
exception to the general rule against retroactive ratemaking.

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A s a convenience to the Court j UI hi lm,s attached a copy

of i he M o m u ain Fuel case to Luis petition as ADOI'MIII i n

J

Brief of inter venor Utah Power & Light C o . at 4,
tah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Services
Commission, N o s . 19361 & 19362, slip op. (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) ; In R e
A p p l i c a t i o n of Utah Power & Light Co., No. 82-035-14, slip o p .
at 3 (P.S.C. Utah December 3 0 # 1982) (mentioning the Mountain
Fuel case in its findings of f a c t ) ; In R e Application of Utah
Power & Light Co., N o . 82-035-14, slip op. at 4 (P.S.C. Utah
December 30, 1982) (mentioning the Mountain Fi lel case a n :i ts
conclusions).
;1
It JI '&L has been unable to obtain a copy oi the
index of the record o n appeal before the Court. T h e clerk has
advised it that t h e Court cannot locate its copy, n o r does tr,.
Public Service Commission, the Attorney General's office, c:
the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Public
Utilities have a copy
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POINT III
IF THE COURT CANNOT
INADEQUATE FINDINGS
CONCERNING THE EBA,
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
BE MADE BY THE PSC.

AFFIRM THE PSC ORDER BECAUSE OF
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
IT SHOULD REMAND THESE CASES FOR
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO

UP&L urges the Court in this Petition to affirm the
PSC Order and preserve the equitable balancing effect and
application of the EBA system.

Alternatively/ in the event the

Court feels that the PSC Order does not contain sufficient
findings and conclusions about the EBA for the Court to
entirely affirm the PSC Order, UP&L urges the Court to remand
these cases to the PSC with direction to make such findings and
conclusions.
The threshold question in an administrative
appeal is whether the record is adequate to
permit meaningful judicial review. If it is
not, and the basis of an administrative
decision is unclear, it may be necessary to
remand the case for preparation of a record
revealing the agency's reasoning process.
Only by focusing on the relationship between
evidence and findings, and between findings
and ultimate action, can we determine
whether the agency's action is supported by
substantial evidence.
White v. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, 678 P.2d
1319, 1322 (Alaska 1984) (citations omitted).

The court may

raise the question of the adequacy of findings of fact and
conclusions of law by the administrative agency on its own
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CASE NO. 81-057-19
- 2and Mountain Fuel Resources in connection with the Clay Basin
storage

field;

(3) "regular" increases in the cost of gas

purchased from pipeline and field suppliers; and (4) an amortization of the resultant year-end unrecovered balance in Account
191 •
The composite effect of the Company's requests, as reflected
in its December 16, 1981, application, would have been to raise
rates to its Utah customers by approximately $23.6 million*

On

December 24, 1981, the Commission approved a tentative increase
in the Company's rates that§ resulted in an annual increase of
approximately $9.1 million, pending the resolution of several
issues that had been raised by the Division of Public Utilities
(Division)•
Subsequent to the Company's December 16 filing for relief in
this case and the Commission's Report and Tentative Order based
on that application, the Commission issued an order approving a
comprehensive settlement in the "Wexpro Case," Case No. 76057-14, et al. (Wexpro Order).

At the hearings held in connec-

tion with this pass-through case, Mountain Fuel filed information
and amended exhibits that reflected, among other things, the
adjustments to rates as required by the conditions and provisions
of the Wexpro Order*
Hearings were held pursuant to notice on January 12-14,
1982, at which Mountain Fuel presented testimony and evidence
concerning its requests. At a hearing on February 4, 1982, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CASE NO. 81-057-19
- 4 who are subject to incremental pricing under Title II of the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, and (b) $18,165,000 as a direct
offset

to gas costs, to be

implemented

over

approximately a

12-month period on a commodity basis"through the use of Account
191.
2.

Champlin Plant' Revenues.

One source of revenues that

affects the determination of Mountain Fuel's gas costs to be
recovered in rates is the revenue received by the Company under
the Btu "make-whole" provisions of an arrangement with Chaanplin
Oil Company
from

in connection with removal of liquid hydrocarbons

certain

gas purchased

through its system.

by Mountain

Fuel and

transported

The Stipulation specified a modification of

the Company's estimate of those revenues for the test year 1982.
3.
storage

Clay Basin

Storage Field Costs.

In connection with

service obtained by Mountain Fuel in

the Clay

Basin

storage field in northern Utah, we find that it is appropriate
that the costs incurred in connection with such service should be
recovered by the Company and reflected in its rates.
find that the costs incurred

since May lf

We farther

1981, pursuant to

tariffs approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in
its Docket

No. CP81-325, are

appropriately

recovered

by

the

Company through its 191 Account mechanism, as agreed to by the
Division and the Company in the Stipulation.

We do not, by this

finding, decide the issue of prospective treatinent of these costs
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 5-

by other means, as raised by the Division in Case No. 81-057-17,
currently pending.
4.

Other Revenues. In Case No. 80-057-10, this Commission

ordered that, as a general practice*, Mountain Fuel would make
direct credit offsets to its gas costs through the 191 Account
for all revenues received from certain transactions denoted as
"Other Revenues."

These

include

the

revenues

from various

transportation arrangements, sales for resaler and the sale of
liquid hydrocarbons.

However, in our April 7, 1981, order in

that case, we also indicated that:
[T]he applicant may petition this Coamission
for exceptions to balancing account treatment
for "other revenues," if in the Company's
opinion other treatment is warranted. Such
requests will be considered on a case by case
basis and will take into account financial.
stability of the Company.
Pursuant to that provision, Mountain Fuel included in its
December 16 application in this case a request that some $7.3
million in Other Revenues received during 1981 be excluded from
direct crediting to Account 191. The Company founded its request
in large part on the low rate of return exhibited for the utility
operations of the Company during 1981.
The Stipulation resolves this by permitting Mountain Fuel to
exclude $2.65 million in July-December 1981 Other Revenues from
being credited to Account 191. The Company has agreed to include
as 191 Account credits approximately $1.31 million in temporary
transportation revenues received in early 1981•
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CASE NO. 81-057-19
~ 6this treatment of the Other Revenue issues constitutes an appropriate resolution under the circumstances and is in the public
interest.

We also encourage the Company and the Division to

explore, discuss and present to the* Commission a proposal for
guidelines or specific treatment of Other Revenues in the future,
as set forth in the Stipulation.
Because

the

Other

Revenue

issues were

settled

by- the

Stipulation, the Commission finds it unnecessary to set forth in
any more detail any guidelines and considerations that would form
the basis for future treatment of Other Revenues.
5.

Composite Result.

Although Mountain Fuel's original

application was for an overall increase in rates of $.21843/dth,
the intervening approval and implementation of the terms of the
Wexpro Orderr the use of the actual year-end balance in Account
191 (including the reflection of the stipulated treatment of the
1981

Other

Revenues

issues) f

and

the

revised

estimate

of

"make-whole" revenues from Champlin Oil Co. xesult in a net
reduction

in

rates related

to gas costs and

•Wexpro Case*

adjustments of $.30662/dth.
6.

December 24 Tentative Order.

To the extent not incon-

sistent with the terms and conditions of the Stipulation premted to the Commission on February 4, 1982# and ratified by
K

s Order, we adopt and ratify the findings and conclusions set'

forth in the Report and Tentative Order in this case issued on
December 24# 1981.
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- 7 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Costs incurred by Mountain Fuel on and after May 1,

1981, pursuant to FERC tariffs in connection with natural gas
storage

service

in the

Clay

Basin

storage

field,

have been

properly incurred in connection with providing utility service to
Utah consumersf and the costs for which Mountain Fuel initially
sought coverage in this case and which were stipulated to by the
Company

and

Account 191.

the

Division

are

appropriately

treated

through

These costs have been incurred for the purposes of

obtaining energy from independent contractors or suppliers whose
prices are prescribed by FERC tariff.

This conclusion does not

preclude the Commission from according these costs general-ratecase treatment

in a future period,

should it subsequently be

demonstrated that such alternate treatment would be warranted.
However, costs incurred prior to an order of this Commission
effecting such a change will be recovered through the 191 Account
process and will not be subject to later disapproval.
2.

Rates for natural gas service that reflect the various

elements, adjustments and reductions set forth in the Stipulation
approved by this Order are just and reasonable.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Commission hereby enters the following:
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- 8 ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the schedules of
rates and charges for natural gas service in Utah heretofore
filed by Mountain Fuel Supply Company*on February 5, 1982, to be
effective February 1, 1982, in connection with the Commissions
February

5 bench ruling approving

the Stipulation are hereby

approved.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 2nd day of August, 1982.

/s/ Milly O. Bernard, Chairman
(SEAL)

/s/ David R. Irviney Commissioner
/s/ Brent H. Cameron, Commissioner

Attest:
/s/ Jean Mowrey, Secretary
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